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Abstract The free movement of goods promotes cross-border transactions. 
Computerization of services and intensified use of the Internet also 
contribute to the development of trade within the EU. Problems that could 
once be addressed almost exclusively or at least prevailingly at a national 
level currently assume cross-border character. This is also true in the case 
of regulation of unfair competition and unfair commercial practices. 
Whereas the substantive regulation of unfair competition in both EU and 
domestic law is quite common in scientific literature, its aspects in private 
international law are often neglected. Since the EU law has to a large extent 
replaced national conflict-of-law and procedural rules with unified EU 
provisions, this article focuses on the EU regulations Rome II and Brussels 
I bis with the emphasis put on the latter. The aim of this article is to review 
the rules determining jurisdiction (and the applicable law) on the basis of 
legal doctrine, current legislation and case law of the Court of Justice of the 
EU. Attention also will be paid to both off-line and on-line situations, as 
well as to the specifics of consumer protection in the context of unfair 
competition and unfair commercial practices. 
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1 Introduction  
 
The European Union law (hereinafter: EU law) on unfair competition has a specific 
character that distinguishes it from the concept of unfair competition that is typical for 
national regulations. It is quite common for domestic laws to specify the unfair 
competition through the general definition clause. Such general clause is absent within 
the EU law, as it only addresses some of the aspects of unfair competition, such as 
misleading and comparative advertising and the protection of trade secrets. In addition, it 
is quite common to include unfair commercial practices into the European Union 
(hereinafter: EU) concept of unfair competition, which is, however, systematically 
speaking, part of consumer protection law. Accordingly, the use of the term “unfair 
competition” can be somewhat misleading within the EU law as it does not fully embrace 
its entire scope of regulation, and is rather limited compared to the concept adopted under 
national legal rules. The true reason behind this scenario is the nature and the (limited) 
scope of EU competence in this area. The competence of the EU to adopt measures in 
matters related to unfair competition acts and unfair commercial practices is closely 
linked to and derived from the regulation of internal market and its functioning.  
 
In the past, differences between national regulations of unfair competition have allegedly 
often hindered trade in goods between Member States. Partial harmonization of 
misleading and comparative advertising and the protection of trade secrets has created 
comparable trade conditions across the EU in this field and removed obstacles to internal 
market. 
 
However, from the point of view of this article, those areas of unfair competition law that 
are harmonized are not relevant. Where there is a common standard, the legal status of 
a competitor is clear and the standard of regulation in other Member States is relatively 
easily identifiable and predictable. However, in areas that are not subject to 
harmonization (or go beyond the minimum harmonized standard), there is uncertainty 
about the legal framework in other Member States, given that the relevant standards are 
inherent to domestic law. Therefore, in case of any cross-border activity, it is of utmost 
importance to determine both the applicable law according to which the particular 
situation will be assessed and which courts have proper jurisdiction to hear the 
proceedings. 
 
Acts of unfair competition in the cross-border context are subject to unified regulation at 
the EU level, as part of the EU policy on judicial cooperation in civil matters. It shall be 
emphasised that this policy is not directly linked to the fundamental freedoms of the 
internal market. Due to the existing divergence in the scope of competences within these 
policies, the EU private international law covers all aspects of unfair competition acts, 
both in terms of conflict of laws, as well as of procedural rules, whereas the EU-
harmonised substantive law is limited to certain aspects of unfair competition (Article 
114 of the Treaty on the functioning of the EU (hereinafter: TFEU), which presupposes 
close connection to the internal market, thus cannot serve as a legal basis for full 
harmonisation, or even unification of substantive law of unfair competition). As a 
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consequence, the notion of “unfair competition” requires different understanding and 
interpretation in these two areas of EU law.   
 
The aim of this article is to identify and specify approaches of the European private 
international law to determining the applicable law and jurisdiction, with emphasis put 
on the latter, in the light of the case law of the Court of Justice of the EU (hereinafter: 
CJEU) and doctrine. The opening chapter concerns the problem of classification and 
interpretation in EU private international law and provides some introductory remarks in 
relation to finding applicable rules on governing law and jurisdiction in cross-border 
unfair competition and unfair commercial practices cases which will be elaborated on 
further. Chapter 3 deals with the question of determining the lex causae (the governing 
law) of unfair competition acts within the EU internal market. This paper is not intended 
to provide a comprehensive analysis of the problem; rather, it briefly introduces and 
reviews the regulation of the said subject matter under EU law, in particular under the 
Regulation Rome II.1 The essential part of this article is found in chapter 4, which is 
devoted to the issue of finding competent national courts to conduct proceedings in 
matters related to unfair competition acts and unfair commercial practices in EU-wide 
cross-border cases. Therefore, the relevant provisions of the Brussels I bis2 are analysed. 
First, the general rule on jurisdiction under Article 4 of the Brussels I bis is elaborated on. 
Further, the alternative rules on jurisdiction under Article 7 and their applicability in cases 
involving the subject matter at hand are analysed with an emphasis on the existing case 
law of the CJEU. A self-contained issue that deserves special attention is the problem of 
determining jurisdiction in cases involving unfair commercial practices, as they affect the 
interests of consumers. The possibility to apply special rules concerning consumer 
contracts is also discussed. Lastly, particular consideration is given to the problem of 
determining jurisdiction in cases involving unfair competition acts committed via the 
Internet. Although the core of the article lies in the issue of determining jurisdiction in 
cross-border unfair competition and commercial practices cases, we would be remiss not 
to also address the conflict-of-law aspects of the subject matter at hand insofar the 
conflict-of-law rules under the Regulation Rome II are helpful for better understanding 
of the procedural rules under Brussels I bis; notwithstanding the requirement for 
complementary interpretation of the two regulations.  
 
2 The problem of classification – some initial thoughts on finding the rules 
applicable to unfair competition and unfair commercial practices cases 
 
The process of finding the applicable rules in order to determine jurisdiction and the 
governing law of a (civil or commercial) case having cross-border implications involves 
two key elements, i.e. classification of the facts of the case, and interpretation of the 
notions used in those provisions. The subsequent text will be based on the following 
assumptions:  
 
- In terms of classification of the facts of the case, the more general the term is that is 
contained in the referring section of the potentially applicable rule, the lower usually 
are the demands placed upon the judge. In other words, in order to establish the 
applicable procedural rule, mere “superficial classification” of the facts of the case 
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and their subsequent subsumption under a legal concept (or a group of concepts) 
that is more general in nature, or even their mere categorisation in one of the sub-
systems of private law, will suffice. The same is also relevant to the process of 
finding the applicable conflict-of-law rule although not entirely. The truth is, the 
notions employed by (the referring section of) procedural rules usually reflect a 
higher degree of generality when compared to those employed by the conflict-of-
law regulations.3 As a result, the process of finding the applicable procedural rule in 
the cross-border context does not necessarily require such a high degree of 
distinction, as is the case of finding an applicable conflict-of-law rule, and definitely 
not as high as is the required degree of distinction when finding the applicable 
substantive rules.4   
- In terms of interpretation of legal notions comprised in procedural and conflict-of-
law rules, a notion more general in nature places greater requirements on the 
applying body or institution. Indeed, in cases where the regulation contains either 
no legal definition, or no guidance as to its interpretation, finding the true meaning 
and the scope of such a notion could be challenging. This is especially true when 
the notion concerned is encompassed in a set of unified rules of private international 
law that are to be interpreted autonomously, with no link to any national law. A great 
example of this can be found in the EU private international law measures, including 
the Regulation Rome II and the Brussels I bis which are both subject to the further 
analysis.   
 
As flows from the introduction, the subject of this article covers two relatively separate 
fields of law: (i) acts of unfair competition, which are limited, in terms of their scope, to 
acts addressed primarily to another competitor, or more precisely to another entrepreneur 
or number of entrepreneurs; and, (ii) unfair commercial practices, which comprise acts of 
entrepreneurs affecting (usually a group of) consumers and their interests. This 
classification is derived both from the legislation introduced under EU directives, as well 
as by national rules adopted as a result of their implementation, but has no reflection in 
EU rules of private international law. These, in contrast, comprise terms of more general 
nature and are wider in scope.  
 
Regarding EU conflict-of-law rules, the Regulation Rome II specifically concerns the 
notion of “acts of unfair competition”, or the denomination “non-contractual obligations 
arising out of unfair competition.”5 While the terminology used may appear as a narrowly 
defined concept of civil tort law, there is neither an overlap of its content with the 
definition of the same or similar notion introduced by the EU directives, nor can any 
definition within the scope of any national law outside the harmonised area play a 
significant role. For the purposes of the Regulation Rome II, it is necessary to understand 
the given notion in broader terms than may be done within the framework of national law. 
This concept follows from the requirement of autonomous interpretation.6 On the other, 
the Brussels I bis employs no analogous notion in any of its provisions. As has already 
been discussed, the degree of generality is higher in case of procedural rules. In particular, 
the Brussels I bis limits itself to distinguishing between jurisdiction in “matters relating 
to a contract” on the one hand, and in “matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict” on 
the other hand.7 The requirement of autonomous interpretation is also true for the latter.  
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It follows that while the content of the notions used by EU directives does not correspond 
to the terminology used by EU private international law measures,8 there is not even an 
overlap between the notions comprised in conflict-of-law and procedural rules of EU 
private international law. However, the latter is more a question of technique and selection 
of the notions used, rather than an intention of the legislator to set a different scope of 
application of the respective EU private international law measures or a lack of 
competence.  
 
Having regard to the requirement for consistent interpretation of the rules of EU private 
international law,9 these should be interpreted in their mutual context and in light of an 
attempt to cover all areas of private law which, by virtue of their substantive definition, 
fall within the scope of the relevant regulations. In practical terms, this means, inter alia, 
that if a conflict-of-law rule (in terms of the present subject matter, it would be a provision 
of the Regulation Rome II) contains more detailed regulation using more casuistic 
terminology, such a rule can serve as a subsidiary source when interpreting notions used 
by procedural rules (that is rules under the Brussels I bis). Further, in the case of EU 
legislation, the meaning of this “source” will be derived from both the actual wording of 
the provisions and the CJEU case law interpreting those provisions.10 
 
As to the applicability of the EU directives relating to unfair competition and unfair 
commercial practices, and in particular the definitions of the notions provided therein, 
they can only be used as guidelines for interpretation and then only with a high-degree of 
caution. Regardless of how identical or convertible as to their meaning they may appear 
at first sight in relation to the notions used either by the Brussels I bis, or the Regulation 
Rome II, the notions contained in the EU directives are of a narrower material scope, and 
their meaning does not fully correspond to the terminology employed by EU private 
international law measures.  
 
3 Determining the law applicable to unfair competition and unfair 
commercial practices with cross-border dimension 
 
At the EU level, non-contractual obligations in civil and commercial matters11 with cross-
border dimension are subject to the conflict-of-law rules of the Regulation Rome II. Not 
only that matters related to acts of unfair competition and/or unfair commercial practices 
are not explicitly excluded from the scope of application of this Regulation;12 moreover, 
they are made subject to special provision under Article 6 of Regulation Rome II. This 
makes the legislation more straightforward13 as compared to regulation of procedural 
issues in cross-border context.14  
 
The initial proposal of the regulation drafted by the Commission referred solely to acts of 
unfair competition.15 However, during the legislative procedure, a conflict rule on acts 
restricting free competition has been added by the Council16.17 As a result, Article 6 now 
covers two seemingly distinct areas of law which are closely related but do not necessarily 
overlap, i.e. acts of unfair competition18 and acts restricting free competition.19 Although 
these two areas of law may seem disparate, as they pursue a different target,20 the common 
denominator of the two, from the perspective of conflict of laws, is to provide legal 
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protection in cases of private-law claims (Rozehnalová, 2013: 177, also Sehnálek, 2017: 
37). As the material scope of Article 6 is wider than the subject-matter of this paper, we 
will limit our subsequent comments to paragraphs 1 and 2 of the said provision, leaving 
aside matters related to “acts restricting free competition”.21  
 
Examining  the Regulation Rome II closer, one discovers that none of its provisions refer 
to state policies, much less state interests, and both the Preamble and the Explanatory 
Report highlight the goal of the Regulation as “to ensure a reasonable balance between 
the interests of the parties, i.e. the person claimed to be liable and the person who has 
sustained damage.”22 Hence, the conflict rules in matters related to unfair competition 
are not premised upon interests of the states but rather upon firmly defined criteria centred 
on the individual interests of competitors and consumers. Even so, the aim of the conflict-
of-law rules “to protect competitors, consumers and the general public, and to ensure the 
proper functioning of market economy” explicitly incorporated in the Preamble23 can be 
perceived as an expression of a public interest24 and the applicable policy of the EU, 
respectively its Member States.  
 
Regarding the subject matter of Article 6 (1) of Regulation Rome II, it is noteworthy that 
the notion “(an act of) unfair competition” requires an autonomous interpretation,25 with 
no reference to any national law and perception of the concept of unfair competition 
therein. Nevertheless, as this conflict-of-law rule operates against the background of a 
number of substantially different national laws of unfair competition, Illmer argues that 
the autonomous interpretation has to take the concepts of unfair competition developed 
under national laws into account (Illmer in: Huber, 2011: 147). Recital (21) of Regulation 
Rome II acknowledges wide and flexible understanding of the notion, and implies that 
modern conflict-of-law instruments must reflect the objective and character of modern 
laws against unfair competition, that is, to protect not only competitors but also consumers 
and the public in general.26 These premises lead to the conclusions that the material scope 
of Article 6 (1) is inevitably wider than is the scope of EU harmonized rules against unfair 
competition27 and unfair commercial practices,28 and that the conflict-of-law rule under 
Article 6 does not correspond to the terminology used either by the EU directives, or 
substantive national laws of Member States. On the other hand, this does not mean that 
both the EU directives and national legal rules on unfair competition cannot serve as 
guidelines when interpreting Regulation Rome II. In fact, they can, and shall do so. Last 
but not least, provisions of Regulation Rome II shall be interpreted in relation to and in 
light of the provisions of other EU private international law measures, in particular the 
Brussels I bis. In practice, this means that where the conflict rules and procedural rules 
employ the same notions, interpretation thereof must be mutually consistent, with regards 
to the objective and scheme of the particular regulations and their scope of application.29  
 
In order to designate the law applicable to obligations arising out of an act of unfair 
competition, Article 6 (1) of Regulation Rome II adopts the criterion of locus damni 
infecti, that is, the place where the effect of a harmful event occurs. Nevertheless, the 
connecting factor is concretized for the purposes of unfair competition acts as “the place 
(country) where competitive relations or the collective interests of consumers are (or are 
likely to be) affected.”30 The specific wording used reflects the protective nature of the 
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provisions against unfair competition (Rozehnalová, 2013: 177). The mere fact that 
competitive relations or collective interests of consumers are likely to be affected by 
unfair competition behaviour in a particular country is enough to determine the law of 
that country as governing the obligations arising out of such behaviour. Where these acts 
have a real effect on competitive relations or collective interests of consumers in a 
particular country, application of the law of that country is undisputable. Furthermore, 
Article 6 (1) applies also to actions for injunctions brought by consumer associations.31  
 
In a very recent case, Verein für Konsumenteninformation v Amazon EU Sàrl, the CJEU 
confronted the question whether the law applicable to an action for an injunction within 
the meaning of Directive 2009/22/EC32 directed against the use of allegedly unfair 
contractual terms by an undertaking established in a Member State which concludes 
contracts in the course of electronic commerce with consumers resident in other Member 
States […] shall be determined in accordance with the conflict rules of the Regulation 
Rome II, particularly with Article 6, or in accordance with Regulation No 593/2008 on 
the law applicable to contractual obligations33 (hereinafter: Regulation Rome I). The 
applicability of Article 6 (1) of Regulation Rome II to situations similar to the one at hand 
was based on the established fact that the concept of “unfair competition acts” shall be 
treated autonomously for the purposes of Regulation Rome II, and interpreted as 
extendable “to any act which is likely to alter relations between the participants on a 
market, whether between competitors or in respect of consumers collectively.”34 In other 
words, within that autonomous meaning, the concept of “unfair competition” shall cover 
the use of unfair contract terms inserted into general terms and conditions, in so far as this 
is likely to affect the collective interests of consumers as a category and, therefore, to 
influence the conditions of competition on the market. As a result, the applicable law shall 
be determined in accordance with Article 6 (1) of Regulation Rome II.35 
 
In cases where the acts of unfair competition affect competitive relations or collective 
interests of consumers in more than one country, the applicable law will be determined 
independently in relation to the market of each country, using the rule under Article 6 (1). 
From the viewpoint of a competitor whose wrongful acts have given rise to harmful 
events affecting competitive relations or collective interests of consumers in several 
countries, the claims will be made subject to different national laws depending on where 
the consequence thereof occurred. Such situations are easily imaginable and very likely 
to arise where unfair competition acts are committed via the Internet. In particular, 
comparative or misleading advertisement put on-line can harm collective interests of 
consumers, as well as competition relations in number of various countries, provided that 
the advertisement is accessible and advertised products or services are available in that 
country.36  
 
The used connecting factor not only serves the purpose of determining the applicable law 
but also limits itself the scope of application of Article 6 (1) of Regulation Rome II. The 
said provision therefore does not apply to cases where an act of unfair competition affects 
exclusively the interests of a specific consumer37 or of a specific competitor.  
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The latter is subject to a special provision under Article 6 (2) of Regulation Rome II which 
stipulates that where individual interests of a specific competitor are affected, the general 
rule under Article 4 of the Regulation Rome II shall apply. According to the conflict-of-
law rules under Article 4, the law applicable to obligations arising out of unfair 
competition acts in this case will be the law of the country in which the damage occurs 
(lex loci damni infecti), irrespective of where the harmful event or indirect consequences 
of that event occurred.38 Subsequent conflict rules under Article 4, that is the law of the 
country of common habitual residence (lex domicili communis),39 or the law of the 
country to which the tort is manifestly more closely connected,40 are applicable as well. 
What remains unclear is whether the choice of the governing law is allowed in cases that 
fall under Article 6 (2), or not.41 We agree with most of the authors who uphold 
the freedom of parties to choose the applicable law. In particular this is because the 
relationship between two individual competitors is, in its nature, different from those 
covered by Article 6 (1) where impact on competitive relations in general or collective 
interests of consumers is anticipated. Article 6 (2) can be applied for example in cases of 
bribery, recruitment of employees, or mongering rumour (Dickinson, 2008:  404).  
 
Finding the governing law in cases where only individual interests of a specific consumer 
are affected is a little more complicated. Regulation Rome II does not provide an explicit 
and clear solution to this problem. Rather, the answer shall be sought in the intersection 
of the two conflict rules regulations, that is, Regulation Rome I and Regulation Rome II, 
as well as in case law of the CJEU. The core of the problem shall be sought in rigorous 
characterization of the circumstances of each particular case. Individual interests of a 
consumer (or a few consumers) will be most likely affected by unfair competition acts, 
or unfair commercial practices speaking in terms of EU directives, in relation to – either 
already existing, or newly emerging (likely to emerge) – contract between a competitor 
and that particular consumer(s). It is true that unfair commercial practices often play a role 
in pre-consensual stage, or when performing the contract on the side of a businessperson. 
What is crucial in our viewpoint, is whether the link to an existing or emerging contract 
is sufficient enough, and significant from the legal point of view. A clue how to solve the 
problem can be found in the already-mentioned case Verein für Konsumenteninformation 
v Amazon EU Sàrl where the CJEU held that “whereas the law applicable to an action 
for an injunction for the protection of consumer’s interests directed against the use of 
allegedly unfair contract terms […] must be determined in accordance with Article 6 (1) 
of Regulation Rome II, the law applicable to the assessment of a particular contractual 
term must always be determined pursuant to Regulation Rome I, whether that assessment 
is made in an individual action or in a collective action.”42 Having said that, the governing 
law shall be determined in accordance with the conflict rules of Regulation Rome I,43 
provided that a considerable link between unfair commercial practices on the one hand 
and a contractual relationship with a particular consumer (or a small number of 
consumers) on the other is established. To the contrary, where a manifest connection to a 
contract does not arise from the circumstances of the case, the general rule for non-
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4 Determining jurisdiction in cross-border disputes arising out of acts of 
unfair competition and unfair commercial practices 
 
4.1 Some introductory remarks on the application of the Brussels I bis 
 
The rules for determining jurisdiction or, more precisely, for determining national courts 
of a particular Member State that are competent44 to settle civil and commercial disputes 
having cross-border dimension are contained in Brussels I bis. The Brussels I bis consists 
of a hierarchy of rules which serve the purpose to find the most suitable forum, taking 
into account in particular the requirement for a close connection (both in factual and legal 
terms) between the venue and the circumstances of a case. The Brussels I bis encompasses 
rules regarding so-called exclusive jurisdiction,45 special46 and alternative47 jurisdictional 
rules, and general rule48  that is in fact of subsidiary character. 49 The parties to a dispute 
also have the option to establish the jurisdiction of a court based on the manifestation of 
their free will50 or, where applicable, by merely not contesting the jurisdiction of the 
court51 seized of the dispute.  
 
Unlike conflict-of-law rules, the procedural regulation does not comprise any special and 
explicit provision on jurisdiction regarding acts of unfair competition or unfair 
commercial practices matters. On the other hand, this subject-matter has not been 
expressly excluded from the material scope of Brussels I bis.52 A contrario, the Regulation 
does cover disputes arising from acts of unfair competition and unfair commercial 
practices, since they undoubtedly represent matters that fall within the scope of civil and 
commercial law (Sehnálek, 2017: 28).53  
 
The decisive factor regarding the applicability of specific provisions of Brussels I bis to 
disputes arising from acts of unfair competition or unfair commercial practices lies in 
correct classification of these (il)legal acts and in subsuming them under one of the more 
general notions that delimit the scope of the individual provisions of the Brussels I bis. 
Due to the relatively general nature of the notions typical for the procedural norms set out 
in Brussels I bis, both in terms of the scope of application (the referring section) and the 
point of contact (the connecting section) of these rules, the case law of the CJEU and 
interpretation provided therein plays a pivotal role. On the other hand, it is true that the 
number of CJEU cases involving matters related to unfair competition or unfair 
commercial practices is not very high. In fact, there are only a few decisions of the CJEU 
that concern the subject matter at hand.  
 
For this reason, this article also reviews decisions in which the CJEU has dealt with 
comparable legal concepts (in terms of the principles and starting points of legal 
regulation) that fall within the material scope of the analysed provisions. Given the more 
general nature of notions used in the referring sections of the Brussels I bis procedural 
rules, we consider such approach completely justified, and from the pragmatic point of 
view, in fact the only approach possible. This is also the case with respect to Article 7 (2) 
of the Brussels I bis, which provides the rule for determining jurisdiction in disputes 
concerning non-contractual obligations.  
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The following parts of this article attempt to analyse selected provisions of the Brussels I 
bis, which in terms of their material scope, could be applicable to determining jurisdiction 
in cross-border unfair competition and unfair commercial practices claims. Attention will 
be given to specific circumstances or conditions under which the application of the special 
or alternative rules of the Brussels I bis is conceivable. In this regard, it is of paramount 
importance to assess in each specific case whether acts of unfair competition or unfair 
commercial practices show a sufficiently close connection to an existing or emerging 
contract or the performance of such, or whether they appear independent on such a 
contract or performance thereof. Special consideration is given to the issue of determining 
jurisdiction in disputes arising out of unfair competition and unfair commercial practices 
committed by means of the Internet. The use of this medium makes it possible to reach a 
wide range of addressees, whether among consumers or other entrepreneurs, though a 
single click, with potential impact in dozens of countries.  
 
For these purposes, several judgements of the CJEU in related cases are briefly reviewed 
and the conclusions thereof made subject to analysis regarding the degree to which 
interpretation provided by the CJEU is applicable to cases involving acts of unfair 
competition and unfair commercial practices. Further, where appropriate, the authors 
suggest how to read and apply conclusions reached by the CJEU in given cases (that are 
not identical in terms of their merits, though) to the subject matter at hand.   
 
4.2 General rule – Article 4 of Brussels I bis 
 
Article 4 (1) of the Brussels I bis contains a general rule for establishing the courts’ 
jurisdiction and constitutes a so-called residual category in terms of the procedural rules 
system in the relevant proceedings. Most of the rest of the rules on determining 
jurisdiction represent a lex specialis in relation to this provision. Parties to a dispute as 
well as Member States’ courts are thus obliged to observe these “special” rules and 
establish jurisdiction based on them instead of the general provision, provided that the 
conditions set in the special rules are met. The only exception from this system consists 
in the procedural norms comprised in Articles 7 and 8 of the Brussels I bis, which are 
equivalent to Article 4 in their nature. In other words, they represent an alternative to the 
general rule from which the plaintiff may choose the most favourable forum according to 
his preferences. 
 
In accordance with the general rule under Article 4 (1), disputes with cross-border 
dimension covered by the Brussels I bis fall within the jurisdiction of the courts of the 
Member State in which the defendant is domiciled.54 The nationality of the defendant or 
the place where his property is situated is irrelevant, and the same applies to the domicile 
of the plaintiff – the latter may be situated in the same Member State (if the cross-border 
element in the proceedings follows from another fact), in another Member State, or even 
in a third country. This provision thus expresses the general principle of procedural law 
“actor sequitur forum rei” and is practical for persons in the position of the passive party, 
i.e. the defendant, as it grants him the advantage of his home country’s jurisdiction.   
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Within the scope of issues discussed in this article, this will concern situations where the 
defendant is a person who has committed unlawful acts that can be classified as unfair 
competition acts, or unfair commercial practices. The defendant will be sued based on 
claims following from the unlawful conduct, usually by multiple plaintiffs, either through 
individual actions or a class action via a consumer protection association or other 
entrepreneurs. In all these cases, the use of the general rule laid down in Article 4 seems 
to be a practical solution, especially in terms of procedural economy and the defendant’s 
legal certainty, since all actions will be concentrated in courts situated within one Member 
State (with the possibility of a joinder of proceedings in accordance with the national 
procedural rules). 
 
The interpretation of the notion “defendant’s domicile” is of crucial importance for 
determining which courts have jurisdiction over a particular case. The Brussels I bis 
includes special rules for determining the domicile of individuals and the domicile of 
legal entities. In terms of establishing whether the defendant who is a natural person has 
his domicile in a given country, the Brussels I bis only refers to national rules, applicable 
either in the country of the court where the proceedings are held, or in the country where 
the defendant apparently has his domicile.55 The domicile of a defendant who is a natural 
person is thus always established based on national rules applicable in the Member State 
in question. On the contrary, the Brussels I bis provides an autonomous definition of a 
“domicile” of legal entities. It is either their (statutory) seat, or the place of the central 
administration, or the principal place of business.56 
 
In terms of the personal scope of application of the Brussels I bis, Article 4 (1) shall be 
read in line with Articles 5 and 6 of the said regulation, and perceived as a precondition 
for application of special57 and alternative rules58 on jurisdiction (Rozehnalová, 2013: 
218). In other words, only a defendant who is domiciled in the territory of a Member State 
may also be sued in courts of another Member State based on the special and alternative 
rules comprised in the Brussels I bis. Nevertheless, where the defendant is not domiciled 
in any of the Member States, this mere fact does not preclude him from being sued before 
Member States’ courts based on the rules on “exclusive jurisdiction”, which rests on 
material terms rather than the domicile of the parties to a dispute,59 or in cases of 
jurisdiction agreed by the parties,60 or by implied application of jurisdiction of the court 
that was seized in the given case.61, 62 
 
4.3 Special rule for civil torts as an alternative to the general rule and its 
applicability in respect of unfair competition 
 
Since the general rule for determining jurisdiction is advantageous for the defendant, the 
other party to the dispute, i.e. the plaintiff, will usually want to avoid it. To balance the 
(contradictory) interests of the parties, the Brussels I bis indeed gives the plaintiff such 
an option. Articles 7 and 8 lay down alternatives to the rule under Article 4, providing the 
plaintiff with the possibility to choose in which Member State to bring an action against 
the other party.  
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As already mentioned, the Brussels I bis provides no special rule on jurisdiction related 
particularly to unfair competition cases. Nonetheless, Art. 7 (2) establishes court 
jurisdiction “in matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict”63, which is more general in 
nature and undoubtedly includes unfair competition cases as an example of civil tort. In 
contrast, the first paragraph of Article 7 provides an alternative rule for establishing 
jurisdiction “in matters relating to a contract”. This dualism of alternative procedural 
rules reflects the roughest classification of obligations to contractual and non-contractual, 
the specific features of liability relationships outside the law of contracts compared to 
concepts of contractual law. Finally, it also reflects the conflict-of-laws regulation of 
obligations under EU law, in particular those laid down in the Regulation Rome I as for 
the law governing contracts and in the Regulation Rome II as for non-contractual 
obligations.  
 
Coming back to the substantive regulation of unfair competition on the EU level, the 
relevant directives64 clearly indicate the effort to balance private and public interests in 
the given area. Public interest is manifested especially in the protection of competition on 
the internal market and ensuring free trade in goods and services, while private interests 
of traders and consumers are protected through the protection of their rights and positions 
that might be affected by the conduct of another trader. The respective positions of traders 
and consumers is where we can see a fundamental difference. In the area under scrutiny, 
traders are usually in the position of a third affected party; i.e., there is typically no 
contractual relationship between them and the person engaging in unfair competition. In 
contrast, conduct of a person pursuing unfair competition aimed towards a consumer 
either results in the creation of a contractual relationship (but is, however, vitiated by 
some kind of defect – e.g. misleading the consumer; failure to provide the required 
information; aggressive practices) and, without such conduct, the contractual relationship 
would likely not be established at all, or the unfair practices of traders are applied within 
an already existing contractual relationship with the consumer and in the provision 
of a performance under the contract. The factor linking the two categories together is that 
the trader’s unlawful conduct affects economic interests, both of other traders and of the 
consumers. Nonetheless, the mentioned classification has fundamental importance in 
terms of determining the applicable procedural rules.  
 
If we limit our analysis to the first category, i.e. conduct aimed against another trader(s), 
it is clear from the above that these cases will be covered by Art. 7 (2) of the Brussels I 
bis, which lays down the rules for determining jurisdiction for non-contractual 
relationships. In the light of this provision, jurisdiction rest with the courts for the place 
where the harmful event occurred or may occur. The formulation of the connecting factor 
in the cited provision reflects the preventive nature of the rules for protection against 
unfair competition, as it envisages court jurisdiction also for the place where there is a 
mere danger of a harmful event. Determination of the venue for claims based on unfair 
competition is therefore based on the trader’s unlawful conduct; the property or any 
analogous rights affected by unfair competition are irrelevant. Such conduct has its cause 
and must therefore occur at a certain place (locus delicti commissi) and also have its 
consequence; in other words, the harmful effects of the conduct will or may occur at a 
certain place (locus damni infecti). These places may be identical, but may also be located 
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in different countries. It is therefore the task of international procedural law to choose a 
criterion for connecting a legal norm that will result in determining the local and legally 
most suitable venue with respect to the interests of the affected parties and the 
requirement for predictability and procedural economy in proceedings with an 
international element.  
 
The rule embodied in Art. 7 (2) of Brussels I bis, which is clear at first sight, entails certain 
difficulties in terms of interpretation and application. Indeed, the notion of the “place 
where the harmful event occurred” is broad and ambiguous and can thus be construed in 
various ways. It comprises terminologically as to both the place where the unlawful 
conduct was committed, i.e. where, for example, untrue information on some other 
entrepreneur or his products was published, or where a comparative advertisement was 
published, and the place where the effects of the unlawful conduct (i.e. damage) occurred, 
e.g., the place where the goodwill or an entrepreneur or his products was harmed or where 
a business opportunity was lost. These “cause and effect” places may be located in 
different countries. It is not unusual if the damage itself occurs in several countries. It will 
be especially difficult to find a suitable solution in those cases where unfair competition 
is pursued within the Internet, as in that case harmful consequences can potentially arise 
in many different countries. Moreover, the problem becomes even more complicated if 
we consider the current reality of commercial relations, as interconnection of individual 
competitors can lead to a situation where harm incurred by one entrepreneur can have an 
indirect influence on the reputation of another entrepreneur connected with the former, 
but having his seat in some other country.65,66    
 
The solution to the questions delineated above can be inferred from the case-law of the 
CJEU pertaining to Brussels I (bis), and the Brussels Convention67.68 However, none of 
the judgements rendered by the CJEU prior to this date scrutinizes the issue of 
determining jurisdiction in cases involving acts of unfair competition or unfair 
commercial practices. It is as if this matter was outside the sphere of interest of national 
courts that refer preliminary questions to the CJEU. Nevertheless, we consider the 
existing case law relevant to the extent to which it deals with non-contractual obligations 
of similar nature that pursue the same objectives, e.g. cases involving cross-border libel. 
In other words, we prefer abstraction over a casuistic approach. 
 
As regards determining the place where the damage occurred, 69 in Mines de potasse 
d’Alsace, the CJEU came to the conclusion that this notion had to be interpreted as 
comprising both the place where the unlawful conduct took place and the place where the 
damage was manifested. In the CJEU’s opinion, it is not purposeful to restrict 
interpretation of the notion of the “place where the damage occurred” to only one of these 
two criteria, as they both can establish a sufficiently close connection with the place where 
the dispute is being pursued and may be relevant, e.g., in terms of taking evidence 
(Rozehnalová, 2013: 222–223). At the same time, these serve as alternatives to each other, 
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In Shevill, 70 the CJEU confirmed the aforesaid conclusions and indicated how the 
criterion of “place where the damage occurred” used in Art. 7 (2) of Brussels I bis should 
be construed in cases of court enforcement of claims ensuing from infringement of moral 
rights by defaming information published in the press. The proceedings before the 
national court were concerned with claims ensuing from liability for damage caused by a 
libel published in press that was distributed, along with the publisher’s country, also in 
several other Member States. The CJEU concluded that, in such a case, the place where 
the harmful event occurred was the place where the given publisher was established, since 
this was where the unlawful conduct causing the ensuing damage had been committed. It 
further inferred that the place where the damage had occurred was also the place where 
the press was distributed, provided that the aggrieved party was known there. Indeed, this 
is where the effects of the unlawful conduct were manifested (Rozehnalová, 2013:  251). 
The competence of courts to conduct proceedings in the given case is established in both 
situations; although the scope of the competence differs. The court determined according 
to the criterion of the place of the unlawful conduct may hear the entire case to the full 
extent of the damage incurred, while the courts determined according to the place where 
the damage occurred may only hear the dispute to the extent of the damage incurred in 
that particular country.71 
 
Generalising this otherwise highly specific solution, it follows that the CJEU used the 
criterion of unlawful (anti-competitive) conduct complemented by the criterion of a 
particularly close connection between the dispute and a specific country. In view of the 
practical procedure in court proceedings (the possibility and availability in terms of taking 
evidence, service of process, etc.), only such a criterion will sufficiently justify the 
existence of jurisdiction of courts of the aforesaid countries, because this solution best 
reflects the requirement for proper and economic process.72 This requirement would not 
be met if the dispute was to be conducted in some other country, where there is no such 
close connection to the dispute. Of course, this does not mean that the dispute could not 
be de facto resolved in this country; however, this would not be purposeful.  
 
Even though the Shevill case was only concerned with libel by the press, the conclusions 
reached therein are also, by analogy, applicable to unfair competition cases. After all, 
libel is ultimately not unknown to law of unfair competition; rather, they are closely 
associated and libel is in fact a special body of offence under unfair competition law 
(Dyer, 1988: 396). This area of law also protects the reputation of competitors, which can 
be harmed not only directly (through libel, unfair comparative advertising, etc.) but also 
through other typical unfair competition practices, such as inducing the likelihood of 
confusion in case of goods or services (where substandard non-branded goods are 
presented as high-quality branded goods). In any case, the same legal rule is to be applied 
to both cases, as the situations are essentially analogous. When interpreting the rule, we 
must bear in mind the necessity to ensure proper and efficacious court proceedings, which 
applies to both cases and which can only be satisfied if there is a close connection between 
the venue and the case at hand. It is once again true that there are other solutions available. 
However, they are not fully aligned with the sense and spirit of the legal regulation and 
the above doctrine underlying the EU legislation stipulating the rules for determining the 
competent court.  
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If the decisive criterion is particularly close connection (close connecting factor or close 
link) to a certain State, which is manifested, in accordance with the judgement in Shevill, 
in the possibility to pursue court proceedings in the State where the infringing (defaming) 
party is established, then we can also infer the competence of the courts of the State where 
the person engaging in unfair competition is established. The connecting factor between 
the two situations is the place of establishment, localising the infringing party in space 
and time, and the damage incurred. The situations differ only as regards the manner in 
which the damage was caused. However, we believe that this fact alone cannot be seen 
as a sufficiently distinctive element justifying a different legal solution.  
 
The same conclusion also applies to the second rule inferred from Shevill. If, according 
to the judgement, a particularly close connection arises due to the effects of the infringing 
defamatory conduct, then jurisdiction of the courts of the State where the effects of unfair 
competition arose must be given by analogy. Yet, the same restrictions must apply here 
and the above statement is thus only true if the aggrieved party actually competed in the 
relevant State. The latter requirement for engagement in competition is analogous to the 
requirement for being known in the relevant country, as stipulated in the Shevill ruling. 
Being known results from being involved in public life in the relevant country, which is 
essentially equivalent to competing (engaging in competition). In this case, just like in 
the previous one, the type of conduct that caused the damage is not sufficiently distinctive 
and, therefore, it is not capable of anchoring the action at a certain place for the purpose 
of determining the venue. However, the effect of the infringement is certainly capable of 
doing so.   
 
In the sense of the above, we can conclude that a competitor whose reputation has been 
damaged, or incurred other damage – whether proprietary or non-proprietary – in a causal 
link with acts of unfair competition taken by another competitor, the aggrieved competitor 
may assert full damages (or other claims under substantive law) from the infringing 
competitor before the courts of the Member State where the infringement (unfair 
competition) took place (as a rule, this will be the country where the person engaging in 
unfair competition is established or represented73). Furthermore, the aggrieved competitor 
may also assert liability claims for damages resulting from unfair competition in courts 
of the Member States where the damage occurred. However, the aggrieved competitor 
may claim in each of these countries only a proportional part of the total damage, 
corresponding to the damage incurred in the country. Nonetheless, we consider this rule 
generally applicable in relation to unfair competition vis-à-vis another competitor, 
regardless of whether it consists in damage to reputation, i.e. the reputation of the 
entrepreneur or his product or services, or in some other offence under unfair competition 
law. 
 
4.4 Applicability of the special provisions for consumer disputes to unfair 
competition cases  
 
With reference to the above classification of competitors’ unlawful conduct as either 
unfair competition or unfair commercial practices, which is based on European directives 
but is not supported by the (European) regulations governing private international law, 
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we can introduce our further considerations to be made in this chapter as follows: While 
unfair competition vis-à-vis another competitor (entrepreneur) is always classified as 
liability for an offence (tort), giving rise to non-contractual obligations,74 we believe that 
the situation is rather more complex if unfair commercial practices (or unfair competition) 
affect also the interests of a consumer/consumers.  
 
As a rule, where unfair commercial practices, and potentially also acts of unfair 
competition, can affect the interests of consumers, they are usually connected to a 
contract, whether already existing or emerging. These can thus occur either at the stage 
of entrepreneur’s performance of a contractual relationship or at the pre-consensual stage. 
Indeed, such conduct on the part of an entrepreneur is often the reason why the consumer 
decides to conclude the respective contract. This contract, or rather the contracting 
process, is then vitiated by a defect which can potentially render the contract invalid.  
 
However, this is irrelevant from the viewpoint of international procedural law. When 
determining the venue, it is of paramount importance to establish whether there is a 
sufficiently close connection between the unfair commercial practices, or unfair 
competition, relating to the consumer and the contract, or whether the unfair commercial 
practices, or unfair competition, are asserted outside a contractual relationship – or, more 
precisely, whether the connection to a contractual relationship is classified as 
insufficiently close. If a close connection to the contract is established, it is then decisive 
to determine whether or not the contract with respect to which the unfair commercial 
practices are asserted meets the defining criteria of a consumer contract, as autonomously 
defined in Brussels I bis; if this is not the case, the jurisdiction will have to be determined 
under the general rule stipulated in Article 4, or alternatively under Art. 7 (1) of Brussels 
I bis, which provides for a special rule for “matters relating to a contract”.75  
 
As regards interpretation of the notions of “contract” and “matters relating to a contract”76 
under Brussels I bis, there has been a predominating tendency to use extensive 
interpretation, where autonomous construction is naturally also conceivable. The legal 
conduct giving rise to a contract should consist in a voluntarily assumed obligation of a 
person towards another person. 77, 78  In this respect, we consider it necessary to note that 
the CJEU does not insist that the obligations are mutual. The term “matters relating to a 
contract” can then involve e.g. the question of existence, or validity, of a contract, claims 
from invalid or non-existent contracts, claims based on breach of contract, including 
compensation for damage or surrender of unjust enrichment, third-party claims under 
contracts concluded for their benefit and even claims from unilateral promises. However, 
if the relevant conduct does not give rise to a contract, then the liability in question will 
be that for a tort, delict, or quasi-delict, which is outside the scope of the rules for 
determining the jurisdiction in matters relating to “contracts”. The non-existence of a 
mutual obligation, however, does not preclude the application of the special rule for 
matters relating to contracts. The CJEU tackled this issue in Petra Engler.79 The above 
party, an Austrian national, received a letter from a German mail order company, 
addressed to her, ostensibly informing her that she had won in a lottery organised by the 
company. Complying with the instructions included therein, she signed the letter and sent 
it back; however, she did not receive any prize. She thus claimed payment of the relevant 
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amount from the German company in court. The CJEU concluded in the preliminary 
ruling procedure that the special rules for consumer contracts under the Brussels I bis 
could not give rise to jurisdiction (of Austrian courts) because no contract had been 
concluded. However, the CJEU held that this did not prevent basing the jurisdiction on 
Art. 7 (1) of the Regulation, as this provision does not require actual conclusion of a 
contract.  
 
It follows from the above that the defining characteristics of a “contract” in the sense of 
Art. 7 (1) are much more vague than those of a consumer contract under Articles 17 et 
seq. of Brussels I bis. The scope of Art. 7 (1) is thus much broader not only as regards the 
parties, but also with respect to the subject-matter of the contract. This is because a broad 
spectrum of claims can be subsumed under Art. 7 (1) even if they are only remotely 
related to a contract. The outlined facts of the Petra Engler case can serve as an example 
of a rather common unfair commercial practice used by an entrepreneur vis-à-vis a 
consumer, and it thus documents the applicability of the rule under Art. 7 (1) to the topic 
at hand. It is also important in terms of the introductory considerations relating to this 
chapter that – unless the dispute involves a consumer contract, which is subject to special 
rules for determining the jurisdiction – the relation to a contract is interpreted rather 
loosely, which makes Art. 7 (1) applicable to a significant number of cases of enforcing 
claims from unfair commercial practices, or unfair competition, vis-à-vis the consumer.  
 
If the defining characteristics of a consumer contract are met in the given case in the sense 
of Article 17 of Brussels I bis80 and if there is simultaneously a sufficiently close 
connection between the unlawful conduct of the entrepreneur on the level of unfair 
competition, or unfair commercial practices, and the conclusion of the contract with a 
consumer or (non-)performance of the contract, then the special rules for determining 
jurisdiction under Articles 18 and 19 apply instead of the general rule (Article 4), or its 
alternative in Art. 7 (1). The basic principle underlying these provisions, and actually 
permeating through the entire EU law, is the requirement for reasonable (i.e. not absolute) 
protection of the consumer as a weaker party. On the procedural level, consumer 
protection manifests itself in the entrepreneur’s duty to only sue the consumer in the State 
where he is domiciled, while the consumer can choose whether to sue in courts of the 
country where the entrepreneur is domiciled (seated), or in his own State. The protective 
provisions also limit the space for procedural free will of the parties, restricting the 
possibility of derogating from regular competence of courts and establishing the 
competence of the courts of another Member State by means of a joint manifestation of 
will. 81 
 
The possibility to apply the special provisions concerning consumer contracts to cases 
involving unfair commercial practices in the pre-consensual phase has also been 
confirmed by the CJEU in its case-law. This is true of the ruling in Rudolf Gabriel,82 
which is, in terms of the facts, ostensibly similar to the above-outlined case of Petra 
Engler. This former case, too, concerned a dispute between an Austrian consumer and a 
German mail order company. The company sent several letters addressed to Mr Gabriel, 
intended to create the impression that if he ordered goods to a specific amount, he would 
automatically be awarded a financial benefit. Mr Gabriel ordered the goods, but received 
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no benefit. This case was different from the case of Petra Engler in that a contract had 
been concluded in this case, as a result of sending the letter promising the benefit (which 
was supposed to be much higher than the value of the ordered goods). The CJEU 
considered this circumstance sufficiently significant, concluding that the contract was a 
consumer contract in its nature and that the claim for payment of the benefit was a 
contractual claim. Therefore, even if the concept of a consumer contract is narrower as 
compared to the concept of a “contract” and “matters relating to a contract” as stipulated 
in Art. 7 (1), the above decision confirms that it is necessary to consider the contract and 
its contents in view of the acts made at the pre-consensual stage, and vice versa. 
 
Finally, the last issue that we perceive in connection with enforcement of claims ensuing 
from unfair commercial practices or unfair competition affecting consumers in cross-
border context lies in applicability of the provisions of Brussels I bis in situations where 
protection against such practices is claimed by consumer protection organisations using 
the instrument of “preventive action”. Such a case was dealt with by the CJEU in Henkel. 
The substance of the case lay in the fact that a German national, Mr Henkel, used unfair 
commercial practices prohibited by Austrian law in his contractual dealings with 
consumers domiciled in Vienna. On the grounds of that conduct, he was sued by an 
Austrian non-profit consumer protection association.  
 
Speaking in legal terms, the substance of the problem lies in the following: 
 
- the dispute has no direct relation to any contract;  
- the action is filed by a third party which, even if a contract had been concluded, 
would not be a party to it; 
- the action is filed even before actual damage occurs; at the stage when it is filed, it 
has preventive nature; 83 
- the consumer protection organisation does not pursue its own interests, but rather 
individual interests of the consumers that it represents and, ultimately, also a public 
interest. 
 
The application of special rules on jurisdiction in matters relating to consumer contracts84 
is prevented not only by paragraph 2 but also by paragraph 1. Consequently, this is not 
a consumer contract within the meaning of the definition laid down in Article 17 of the 
Brussels I bis. We believe that in view of the aforesaid, paragraph 1 cannot be reconciled 
with the above even through extensive interpretation of the notion “contract”, which is 
not possible for special provisions anyway. Paragraphs 2 and 3 can further prevent the 
application of the rules for determining jurisdiction in cases of non-contractual 
obligations, as damage has yet to occur and is only more or less imminent. Moreover, it 
will be incurred by some other entity. Finally, it could be argued that paragraph 4 might 
exclude the applicability of Brussels I bis, which restricts its scope only to civil and 
commercial matters, and thus lays down rules for determining court jurisdiction in cases 
of enforcement of private-law claims and protection of private interests.  
 
Primarily, it must be stated that although a consumer association can be perceived as an 
entity protecting the public interest, it is nonetheless an entity under private law that has 
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no special powers nor is authorised to exercise public authority. Furthermore, even if we 
accepted the broad concept of contract, where such an approach is currently not embraced 
by EU law,85 this concept can in no case comprise an entity that is not, has never been 
and never will be a party to the contract.86 Existing case-law of the CJEU moreover 
indicates that the regulation of tort, delict or quasi-delict in Brussels I bis is concerned 
with all questions aimed to enforce the defendant’s liability and are not matters relating 
to a contract and the rules set out for them.87 Finally, as regards paragraph 3, i.e. that 
damage has yet to occur, it must be emphasised that a requirement for actual occurrence 
of damage as a prerequisite for application of Art. 7 (2) of Brussels I bis does not follow 
from that provision, nor is it a decisive factor for determining court jurisdiction.88 To the 
contrary, the mere wording of Art. 7 (2) indicates the preventive nature of the provision, 
implying that preventive actions are permissible.  
 
We can therefore conclude that preventive actions for the protection of consumers against 
unfair commercial practices that are filed by consumer protection organisations fall 
substantively within the scope of Art. 7 (2) of Brussels I bis, as they relate to tort, delict 
or quasi-delict. Indeed, our conclusion is also confirmed by the current case-law of the 
CJEU.89 
 
4.5 Determining jurisdiction in disputes concerning acts of unfair competition 
and unfair commercial practices in the Internet environment  
 
Just as means of electronic communication result in a growing number of cross-border 
contracts concluded among traders and between traders and consumers, which thus have 
a relation to laws of several countries, easier access to the Internet also facilitates unlawful 
conduct, where the results can be manifested in dozens of different countries, and 
potentially anywhere in the world. The above applies not only to criminal activity, but 
also to civil torts, including unfair competition and unfair commercial practices. It is 
easily conceivable that misleading or comparative advertisements will be posted on-line, 
where such advertising can cause harm to other traders and consumers in each and every 
country where it is accessible via the Internet and where the offered goods or services can 
be purchased. Similar to other offences, such as freeriding on reputation of the enterprise 
or products of some other entrepreneur, creating a likelihood of confusion, disparaging, 
or violating business secrets, means of electronic communication can be used in this case, 
thus extending the effects of the competitor’s unlawful conduct to a number of foreign 
jurisdictions. With slight exaggeration, it could be submitted that today a single click can 
cause harm to a high number of competitors and/or consumers in various parts of the 
world.  
 
The problem that arises in connection with determining the venue in cases of unfair 
competition on the Internet,90 to which international law must respond through suitably 
formulated procedural norms, lies especially in localisation of the unlawful conduct 
(locus delicti commissi) and its effects (locus damni infecti) and their connection to 
national legislation. In other words, the substance of the problem remains the same as in 
the traditional, “off-line” environment. However, its solution is complicated by the fact 
that, on the Internet, it is difficult to find the required close (while sufficiently substantial) 
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connection or link to a specific single body of national legislation. Analogous 
considerations apply to determining the venue, i.e. the system of national courts that 
should have jurisdiction to hear and decide on claims of persons affected by unfair 
competition in the light of the requirement for predictability of the solution91  and 
efficiency of conducting the proceedings.  
 
The Brussels I bis, notwithstanding the fact that the regulation has recently been revised 
and recast, does not comprise any special rule concerning the enforcement of claims 
ensuing from unlawful conduct on the Internet. One must therefore remain content with 
the “classical” rule for determining court jurisdiction in cases of unlawful conduct as 
analysed above, and overcome this shortcoming by means of interpretation. Given the 
absence of case-law that would specifically deal with the issue of unfair competition or 
unfair commercial practices on the Internet, we must yet again use as a starting point 
those rulings of the CJEU that deal with an analogous subject, which is in fact related to 
unfair competition – defamatory conduct on the Internet.  
 
The above-indicated conclusions of the CJEU in Shevill were relativized in the recent 
ruling of the CJEU in joined cases eDate Advertising and Martinez,92 which concerned 
libel (and means of protecting personal rights) in the on-line environment. The basic 
starting point lies in consideration that the effects of an (il)legal act in the environment of 
the Internet can be manifested anywhere in the world93; in terms of procedure, this means 
that a person pursuing unfair competition can be sued in any country of the world. From 
the viewpoint of the person affected by unfair competition, the aforesaid could ultimately 
represent the option to claim court protection anywhere in the world, as conduct pursued 
via the Internet can have effects worldwide. Nonetheless, this approach would lead to 
absolutely absurd results, where a dispute could be pursued practically anywhere, in any 
country, where this would undermine the very sense and purpose of Brussels I bis, 
including the sense of Art. 7 (2) of the Regulation (Sehnálek, 2017: 33). It must therefore 
be rejected.  
 
In joined cases eDate Advertising and Martinez, the CJEU faced the question of how it 
should interpret Art. 7 (2) of Brussels I bis and determine the court with jurisdiction in a 
case where proceedings were concerned with claims of a person aggrieved by unlawful 
infringement of moral rights by disseminating untrue information via a website. In other 
words, the conclusions made in Shevill had to be adapted to new conditions, specifically 
those of the Internet.  
  
Both the Advocate General and the CJEU concluded that the connecting factor consisting 
of distribution or dissemination of information on the Internet and the ubiquity of the 
content of published information was no longer important, 94 and “[m]oreover, it is not 
always possible, on a technical level, to quantify that distribution with certainty and 
accuracy in relation to a particular Member State or, therefore, to assess the damage 
caused exclusively within that Member State.” 95 In the centre of attention remains the 
criterion of close link (connection) between the dispute and a specific country, which is 
defined in that decision by means of the “place of the centre of interests” of the person 
affected by the harm. According to the Court of Justice, this “... corresponds in general 
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to his habitual residence. However, a person may also have the centre of his interests in 
a Member State in which he does not habitually reside, in so far as other factors, such as 
the pursuit of a professional activity, may establish the existence of a particularly close 
link with that State.”96 There, this person can then sue for compensation for the entire 
damage incurred. With reference to the ruling in Shevill, it remains true in the on-line 
environment that compensation for full damage can be claimed in the country of domicile 
(seat) of the publisher, which is considered the place of unlawful conduct. Finally, 
compensation for damage may also be claimed in all countries where the given 
information was published, provided that the aggrieved person was known there and 
could thus have incurred damage thereby. However, the courts of these countries have 
only jurisdiction to hear and decide on claims pertaining to the harm caused in the given 
country. It is thus up to the aggrieved party to choose in which Member State it will claim 
compensation for the damage incurred. While the CJEU should have the task to clarify 
general or ambiguous notions comprised in EU law, it is a question whether this task was 
actually performed in the case at hand and whether the indicated approach is consistent 
with the objectives of Brussels I bis, especially in view of the requirement for a high 
degree of predictability of the rules for determining jurisdiction.97 It can be quite 
justifiably claimed that this was not the case.98  
 
If we, nonetheless, attempt to apply the aforesaid to cases of unfair competition and 
enforcement of ensuing claims, it must primarily be considered who will be the person 
aggrieved by unfair competition and who will have the position of plaintiff. The most 
typical example will be a situation where an act of unfair competition employing 
electronic communication media has affected the interests of another competitor 
(entrepreneur). In the light of the ruling in eDate Advertising and Martinez, it can be noted 
that such a person will be able to initiate proceedings before the courts of the Member 
State (i) where the competitor pursuing unlawful conduct has his domicile (seat) 99, as this 
will be considered the place of the unlawful conduct;100 (ii) at any other place where an 
act of unfair competition was committed that caused damage to the affected competitor; 
and (iii) finally, at the place where the “centre of interests of the person affected by the 
unfair competition” is located. In all those countries, the aggrieved person can sue for 
compensation for the full damage caused by the unfair competition. In this respect, the 
construction of the notion of “centre of interests of the affected person”, in particular the 
“centre of interests of the affected competitor” is of a key importance. If the conclusions 
of the CJEU specified above are applied analogously in this respect, we consider that this 
place will be located in the country where the affected competitor is established, i.e. where 
he has his “domicile”, or where his place of business or headquarters are located.101 Of 
course, an action may also be filed in other countries where the given entity engages in 
competition, whether through a branch or on a one-off basis in cross-border provision of 
services or supply of goods. In those cases, however, the courts’ jurisdiction will only be 
restricted to harm caused in the territory of that country. In our opinion, the aforesaid can 
also apply in those cases where the plaintiff is a consumer protection organisation.  
 
In contrast, if an action is filed by a consumer affected by an act of unfair competition or 
unfair commercial practice committed on-line, one would tend to prefer application of 
the special provisions concerning consumer contracts. The question thus stands how the 
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above should be interpreted in those situations where means offered by the Internet are 
used for such acts. If the defining elements of a consumer contract as laid down in Article 
17 of Brussels I bis do not exist or if a sufficiently close link is lacking between an act of 
unfair competition or unfair commercial practice and the creation of a contract or its 
performance, it is conceivable that the general rule for determining court jurisdiction laid 
down in Article 4, or alternative rules in Article 7102 of Brussels I bis, could apply even 
in the case of a consumer as plaintiff. In respect of application of those rules, we refer to 




The particular conflict-of-law and jurisdictional rules contained in Regulation Rome II 
and Brussels I bis show high degree of generality. Therefore, without reference to existing 
doctrine of private international law, it is not possible to solve even current problems that 
emerge in terms of finding the applicable law and competent courts in cross-border cases.  
 
The rules of EU private international law were formulated to reflect both individual 
interests of private parties, as well as public interest in the proper functioning of the 
internal market. Speaking in terms of unfair competition, the private interests are 
represented by individual interests of competitors and consumers.  
 
The Brussels I bis does not explicitly mention matters related to unfair competition. It is, 
therefore, necessary to use an alternative rule for determining the jurisdiction in cases 
involving non-contractual obligations contained in Article 7(2) of the said Regulation. 
The action can therefore be brought before the courts of the Member State where the 
harmful event occurred or may occur. The interpretation of this provision is unfortunately 
problematic as the appearance of a harmful event can be understood as the place where 
the damage occurred or the place where the event giving rise to the damage occurred. For 
the purposes of unfair competition claims, the place of damage shall be understood as any 
place where the trader participates in the competition and is damaged in his 
interests. However, in such jurisdiction, only the damage suffered there may be dealt with, 
not damage as a whole. The whole damage may be claimed only in state determined 
according to the latter connecting factor for the application. 
 
However, the rule on what amount of damages can be claimed before courts of a particular 
Member State is modified in cases where the harm is caused through the use of the 
Internet. An additional criterion has been defined by the CJEU for these purposes, and 
that is the trader's centre of interest. The reason for this additional criterion is that the 
traditional approach which is based on the determinant connected to the dissemination of 
information loses its distinctive ability in the realm of the Internet. The criterion of centre 
of the interest largely overcomes these shortcomings. Consequently, in every country 
where such a centre of interests exists, the competitor will be able to sue for all the harm 
suffered. In case of other states, the general rule remains unchanged. Common to both 
situations is that it is based on anticompetitive behaviour and complemented by a 
particularly close link between the dispute and a particular state. 
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Acts of unfair competition can also adversely impact interests of consumers. The 
consumer will then most likely seek defence against unfair commercial practices, and 
usually because of a particular contract or obligations arising therefrom. The most likely 
scenario is thus the application of the special rules on jurisdiction in case of disputes 
arising out of consumer contracts under Brussels I bis Regulation. The solution will be 
conceptually the same, regardless of whether the behaviour has occurred in the “real 
world” or on-line.  If the conditions for the application of a specific rule for consumer 
contracts are not met, the consumer will be obliged to proceed in accordance with the 
general rule on jurisdiction under Article 4 or the alternative rules contained in Article 7 
of the Brussels I bis. The said rules are applicable also in cases involving on-line unfair 
competition acts (unfair commercial practices). One shall bear in mind the specific 
interpretation of the used criteria in matters related to on-line torts of unfair competition 
as can be derived from the CJEU case law.  
 
On the other hand, Regulation Rome II contains explicit and special rules for determining 
the applicable law in matters related to unfair competition. The interpretation of the 
concept for the purposes of this Regulation is autonomous and also includes the issue of 
unfair commercial practices regulated by EU law. It also applies to the pre-contractual 
stage (without any link to a specific contract) if the purpose of the action is to prohibit the 
use of disproportionate provisions in consumer contracts. According to Article 6 (1) of 
Regulation Rome II, the applicable law is the law of the State where the competitive 
relations or the common interests of consumers are or are likely to be affected, except in 
situations that do not have a general impact in the sense that they concern only one single 
competitor, or consumer. In such a case, the procedure provided for in Article 4 of the 
Rome II Regulation and the applicable law will in general be the law of the country where 
the damage occurred. 
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42 See the operative part of the CJEU's judgment in Verein für Konsumenteninformation v. Amazon 
EU Sàrl, para. 81(1). 
43 Namely, it would be the special rules on law applicable to consumer contracts under Article 6, or 
even general rules under Articles 3 and 4 of the Regulation Rome I.   
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45 Article 24 of the Brussels I bis. 
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contracts. 
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to the founding treaties, the Regulation does not apply to and is not binding on the Kingdom of 
Denmark). 
55 See Article 62 of the Brussels I bis.  
56 Article 63 of the Brussels I bis.  
57 I.e. rules on jurisdiction in disputes arising from insurance contracts, consumer contracts, and 
individual employment contracts. See Articles 10 to 23 of the Brussels I bis.   
58 Articles 7 and 8 of the Brussels I bis.  
59 See Article 24 of the Brussels I bis. 
60 Article 25 of the Brussels I bis. 
61 Cf. Article 26 of the Brussels I bis. See also Rozehnalová, 2013: 222–223. 
62 See also Article 6 of the Brussels I bis.  
63 “All claims for the liability of a defendant which are not related to a ‘contract’ within the meaning 
of Article 7 (1) of the Brussels I bis are included” (Pauknerová, 2008: 141, Rozehnalová, 2013: 
245). 
64 Particularly Directive 2006/114/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 
December 2006 concerning misleading and comparative advertising (codified version), OJ L 376, 
27. 12. 2006, pp. 21–27, and Directive (EU) 2016/943 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 8 June 2016 on the protection of undisclosed know-how and business information (trade 
secrets) against their unlawful acquisition, use and disclosure, OJ L 157, 15. 6. 2016, pp. 1–18. 
65 So, e.g., in situations where subsidiaries are affected, negative consequences may also be felt by 
the parent company, and vice versa. It is no exception in the present globalised world that such two 
companies are seated in different countries. 
66 Beyond the scope of the legal problems indicated above, it may also be asked whether in a 
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competitors have the option to choose among different individual venues or whether they are 
mutually bound by applications that have already been filed or by the choice of venue made, e.g., 
by the first of their ranks; further issues and questions could certainly be found. 
67 Brussels Convention (1968) on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters, consolidated version, OJ L 299, 31. 12. 1972, pp. 32–42. 
68 The fact that the previous legislation is interpreted in these decisions is not an obstacle on its 
own, because there have been no major changes in the text of the legislation in this area. 
Furthermore, the new regulation itself declares continuity with the previous one. See point 38 of 
the Preamble to the Brussels I bis. Continuity has been ensured since the Brussels Convention of 
1968, and the CJEU's previous conclusions are therefore considered valid even today, unless the 
law or recent case-law explicitly indicates the opposite. Compare the judgment of the CJEU (Fifth 
Chamber) C-147/12, ÖFAB, Östergötlands Fastigheter AB v Frank Koot and Evergreen 
Investments BV, ECLI:EU:C:2013:490, paras. 28 and 29. See also Pauknerová, 2008: 126. 
69 Direct damaged where there is a casual link between the unlawful act and its origin. See also 
Rozehnalová, Týč, 2003: 209. 
70 Judgment of the CJEU C-68/93, Fiona Shevill, Ixora Trading Inc., Chequepoint SARL and 
Chequepoint International Ltd v Presse Alliance SA, ECLI:EU:C:1995:61 (hereinafter: Shevill). 
71 We would like to point out that there was no such similar restriction that developed in the area of 
public regulation of competition (antitrust). Therefore, the courts may, in both situations discussed 
above, deal with the damage caused for example by cartel agreement in its entirety. Our opinion is 
that the reason for such different approach was correctly identified by Advocate General Jääskinen 
(even though the CJEU did not agree with him in its final conclusions), when he stated in his 
Opinion that it seems useful to take into account all the places where the market was disturbed  by 
the infringement of the Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, since the purpose 
of the rules of competition law is to protect the proper conduct of an economic activity, i.e. the 
public interest, and not to protect the individual interests of the company, as in the case of libel, as 
well as damage caused by unfair competition. In the area of public regulation of competition, 
however, this interest covers the entire territory of the EU, which justifies such a different approach. 
Cf. the Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen in the CJEU’s case C-352/13, Cartel Damage 
Claims Hydrogen Peroxide SA (CDC) v Evonik Degussa GmbH and others,  
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2443, para. 50. See also Wurmnest, 2016: 242. 
72 Cf. Judgment of the CJEU (Fourth Chamber) C-352/13, Cartel Damage Claims Hydrogen 
Peroxide SA (CDC) v Evonik Degussa GmbH and others, ECLI:EU:C:2015:335, para. 41. 
73 We consider, however, that this might not apply universally. While it is difficult for a publisher 
to publish press in some other country, an entrepreneur can easily act even outside the country 
where he is established, especially in terms of the EU internal market free movement. 
74 As regards the applicability of the European international procedural law, this means that the 
only applicable provision is the above-mentioned Article 7 (2) of the Brussels I bis, rather than the 
general rule.  
75 Meaning other than consumer contracts, as stipulated under Article 17 of the Brussels I bis.  
76 These terms are primarily concerned by Article 7 (1) of the Brussels I bis, which provides an 
alternative rule to establish jurisdiction in disputes related to cross-border contracts. Similarly, 
Article 17 et seq refers to disputes arising out of consumer contracts.  
77 Cf. judgment of the CJEU, C-26/91, Jakob Handte & Co. GmbH v Traitements Mécano-
chimiques des Surfaces SA., ECLI:EU:C :1992 :268. 
78 When determining the meaning of this notion, Regulation Rome I can serve as an interpretative 
tool and guideline. In particular, we refer to Article 12 thereof which provides a list of questions 
that fall within the scope of the law applicable to contractual obligations. The possibility to use 
Regulation Rome I as a guideline when interpreting provisions of the Brussels I bis is derived from 
the principle of consistent interpretation of EU private international law notions.  
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79 Judgment of the CJEU (Second Chamber), C-27/02, Petra Engler v Janus Versand GmbH, 
ECLI:EU:C:2005:33. 
80 We are dealing here with an autonomous concept of a consumer contract, which is not necessarily 
identical with the notions of consumer law and contractual relationship under the national 
substantive law and even under European directives.  
81 See Article 19 of the Brussels I bis.  
82 Judgment of the CJEU (Sixth Chamber), C-96/00, Rudolf Gabriel, ECLI:EU:C:2002:436. 
83 From the perspective of the objectives pursued by the European Union in relation to consumer 
protection, preventive actions or measures are generally of paramount importance, as for the person 
concerned it is easier to prevent the damage rather than to eliminate the consequences thereof 
through a rather complicated system of judicial enforcement (Wilman, 2016: 915).  
84 Articles 17 to 19 of the Brussels I bis.  
85 Cf. the Opinion of Advocate General Saugmandsgaard in case Verein für 
Konsumenteninformation v Amazon EU Sárl, para. 50: “Although the concept of a contractual 
obligation is not limited to binding relations between the parties, it means at least a concrete and 
existing obligation ...”.  
86 Moreover, this entity is not in the position of consumer. 
87 Ibid, para. 36. 
88 The aforesaid is evidenced by the rulings of the CJEU analysed above.  
89 See the judgment in case Verein für Konsumenteninformation v Amazon EU Sàrl, para. 38. 
90 These considerations are, of course, of a more general nature and can therefore be related to any 
civil delict committed in the online environment using the means of electronic communication.  
91 The principle of the foreseeability of the solution is also explicitly mentioned in Recital (15) of 
the Brussels I bis. See also Hrnčiříková, Ryšavý, 2014: 69. 
92 Judgment of the CJEU (Grand Chamber), joined cases C-509/09 and C-161/10, eDate 
Advertising GmbH v X and Olivier Martinez and Robert Martinez v MGN Limited, 
ECLI:EU:C:2011:685 (hereinafter: eDate Advertising and Martinez). 
93 Cf. the judgement in case eDate Advertising and Martinez, para. 46.  
94 See the Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón in joined cases C-509/09 and C-161/10, 
eDate Advertising GmbH v X and Olivier Martinez and Robert Martinez v MGN Limited, 
ECLI:EU:C:2011:192, paras. 44 – 47 and the judgement in eDate Advertising and Martinez, para 
46.  
95 See the judgement in eDate Advertising and Martinez, para. 45. 
96 Ibid, para. 49. 
97 As already stated, such requirement is also incorporated in Recital 15 of the Brussels I bis. 
98 The use of the connecting factor consisting in distribution or dissemination of information has a 
limited relevance within the Internet environment as it leads to uncertainty. This is also reflected 
by the CJEU in its case law. Nevertheless, instead of adopting a wax of interpretation that would 
overcome such a shortcoming and help to increase legal certainty, the CJEU resigns and introduces 
an approach that, in fact, results in the opposite (Kuipers, 2012: 1220).      
99 In light of its wording, this rule is in fact no alternative to the general rule under Article 4 of the 
Brussels I bis.  
100 Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that in cases of acts of unfair competition, unlike libels published 
in a newspaper (no matter whether in print or electronic), it is quite imaginable that those places 
will not be located within single Member State. Further, especially within the EU internal market, 
it is easy to commit an act of unfair competition in a Member State, or Member States other than 
the one where the competitor is seated.  
101 Here, we use the term “domicile” in respect of legal persons and natural persons operating a 
business as set out in Article 63 of the Brussels I bis.  
102 Depending on classification of a certain act as conduct pursued within a contractual obligation 
or outside of it, it possible to apply Art. 7 (1) or (2) of the Brussels I bis.  
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